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Abstract 
This study presents the results of a review of available recent international operating 
experience reported by nuclear power plants regarding digital I&C systems. Event reports 
retrieved from IAEA and US NRC databases are characterised and used to derive insights 
and lessons learned. 
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Foreword 
The European Network on Operating Experience Feedback (OEF) for Nuclear Power 
Plants, hereafter referred to as European Clearinghouse on OEF, was established in 2008 
by group of European Nuclear Safety Regulators and institutions for promoting 
collaboration on OEF, dissemination of the lessons learned from NPP operating 
experience and understanding the role of operating experience feedback systems in safe 
and economic operation of existing, as well as new build NPPs and promotion of 
advanced event assessment approaches and methods. 
Currently eighteen European nuclear safety regulatory authorities (Finland, Hungary, The 
Netherlands, Lithuania, Romania, Slovenia, Switzerland, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, France, Germany, Slovak Republic, Sweden, Spain, UK, Ukraine and Poland) 
and three European Technical Support Organizations (TSOs, from Belgium, France and 
Germany) are represented. 
The main objectives of the European Clearinghouse on OEF are to:  
— Contribute to the improvement of the OEF in European NPPs through strengthening 
and sharing the competences in OEF, as well as improving communication and co-
operation inside the CH network and with the international OEF community.  
Specifically cooperation between licensees, regulatory authorities and TSOs in order 
to collect, communicate and evaluate information on reactor operating events and 
systematically and consistently apply the lessons learned in all the members' 
countries; 
— Establish European best practice for assessing NPP operating events, through the use 
of state-of-the art methods, computer aided assessment tools and information 
gathered from various national and international sources, e.g. EU national regulatory 
authorities’ event reporting systems and the International Reporting System for 
Operating Experience jointly operated by the IAEA and OECD-NEA; 
— Provide staff to coordinate the OEF activities of the European Clearinghouse and 
maintain effective communication between experts from European regulatory 
authorities and their TSOs involved in OEF analyses; and 
— Support the long-term EU policy needs on OEF by harnessing JRC and European TSO 
research competencies on the methods and techniques of nuclear events evaluation. 
The office of the European Clearinghouse is operated by the Joint Research Centre of the 
European Commission. The European Clearinghouse regularly carries out in-depth 
analyses of events related to a particular topic (the so-called "topical studies") in order to 
identify main recurring causes, contributing factors and to disseminate the lessons 
learned aiming at reducing the recurrence of similar events in the future. 
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1 Introduction 
A topical study on events related to NPP's digital instrumentation and control systems 
was published by the EU Clearinghouse in 2013 [1]. Given the fast developments in this 
domain and the interest of the international nuclear safety community, as expressed by 
the OECD / NEA Working Group on Operating Experience, the Clearinghouse office was 
instructed to review the events reported in the years after the publication of the study. 
This note presents the results of such an update. 
In general, digital I&C systems are characterised by using a sequential sampling of input 
data, as compared to the continuous flow of data of analogue technologies. Digital I&C 
equipment takes up much less physical volume than their analogue counterparts and 
require much less cabling. Some of the main advantages of digital systems are that they 
are less susceptible to measurement drift, they allow for more flexibility in the 
configuration of operation parameters and they provide enhanced self-diagnostics and 
monitoring capabilities. On the other hand, digital systems are typically more difficult to 
be verified and validated, and software may introduce common cause failure modes 
potentially defeating the defence in depth provisions of the plant design. Furthermore, 
digital systems require the staff of the plant to develop new skills, often very different 
from those required for the analogue components. 
The purpose of this report is to review the events reported by the NPPs around the 
world to highlight the problems which have been actually encountered in recent years, to 
derive the lessons learned and the corrective actions than can be implemented to prevent 
recurrence; and, eventually, to formulate the recommendations for regulatory bodies and 
policy makers that could help to ensure a safe adoption of the digital technology by the 
nuclear industry. 
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2 Regulatory context 
The introduction of software and computer based equipment in the nuclear industry, and 
particularly the challenges associated to the licensing aspects, has attracted the attention 
of national regulatory bodies as well as of international organisations, such as the 
European Commission, the IAEA and the OECD/NEA. 
In the period 1995-2000, a task force of experts from European nuclear safety institutes 
sponsored by the European Commission was given the mandate of ”reaching a consensus 
among its members on a number of software licensing issues which have important 
practical aspects”, leading to the publication of a common position in 2000 [2], which 
was subsequently updated. Later, at the request of WENRA, a new report was published 
in 2007 based on the previous work, and revised up to its latest version in 2018 [3]. This 
latest version represents a common position endorsed by the regulatory bodies or 
technical support organisations from the group of participating countries, including 
Belgium, Finland, Germany, Spain, Sweden and the UK (in Europe) as well as Canada, 
China and South Korea. Furthermore, the US NRC participated to some extent to this 
effort, providing input and publishing one version of the report under the NUREG/IA 
series.    
The common position [3] reviews a number of important licensing issues, comparing 
different licensing approaches and establishing where possible a consensus on 
requirements and recommended practices. 
The IAEA's specific safety requirements SSR-2/1 [4] contain a number of requirements 
on instrumentation and control systems (req. #59 through #67), one of which (req. #63) 
addresses specifically the use of computer based equipment in systems important to 
safety. Furthermore, the IAEA provides guidance in complying with these requirements 
through the specific safety guide SSG-39 [5], currently in its 2016 version. This guide 
covers both analogue and digital I&C systems including software, with some sections 
specifically dedicated to the latter. 
In addition to the safety requirements and associated guidance, the IAEA has also 
published various technical reports covering digital I&C themes. One of them [6] reviews 
different challenges faced by the nuclear industry in the transition from analogue to 
digital technologies, providing an excellent overview of the regulatory concerns linked to 
it. 
More specifically, this IAEA report discusses the following 17 issues: (1) self-diagnostics 
(as compared to surveillance testing); (2) independent verification and validation; (3) 
management of the functional requirements specification; (4) configuration 
management; (5) common cause failures (particularly software CCFs); (6) use of smart 
devices (sensors and actuators including software-based technologies); (7) safety 
classification (lack of internationally harmonised approaches); (8) computer security; (9) 
harmonisation of standards; (10) online condition monitoring; (11) environmental 
qualification (particularly electromagnetic interference effects); (12) impact of hardware 
description language programmable devices (application specific integrated circuits, 
complex programmable logic devices and field programmable gate arrays); (13) digital 
communications (how to prevent that data exchange between redundant channels or 
safety and non-safety systems defeats the defence-in-depth approach); (14) safety 
classification of soft controls; (15) formal methods of software development; (16) use of 
wireless technology; and (17) the treatment of digital I&C in probabilistic safety 
assessments. 
For its part, the OECD/NEA has recently established a working group on digital I&C 
(WGDIC), which builds on the previous work developed by the MDEP Digital 
Instrumentation and Controls Working Group (DICWG) from 2008 to 2017. The 
participating countries (Canada,   China,   Finland,   France,   India,   Japan, South   
Korea,   Russia,   South   Africa, the U.A.E., the UK and the US) reached during this 
6 
period a total of 13 common positions covering various topics, which are publicly 
available1. 
                                           
1 http://www.oecd-nea.org/nsd/cnra/wgdic.html 
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3 Scope 
3.1 Digital I&C systems 
Only events related to digital I&C systems have been reviewed for this study. Although 
there is no universally accepted definition of a sharp line separating digital from analogue 
systems (as often I&C systems contain both digital and analogue components combined), 
as far as this study is concerned, an I&C system has been considered as digital if it is 
computer based or if it is mainly composed of components programmed with hardware 
description languages. Furthermore, any event where software has a role to play has also 
been included in the scope of the study. 
3.2 Operating experience databases 
Two major databases were used in order to obtain information about events related to 
digital I&C systems: IAEA IRS and the US NRC LERs. A brief description of each of them 
follows. 
Table 1. List of operating experience databases reviewed 
Database Access Advantages Limitations 
IAEA/OECD IRS  Restricted 
• Worldwide coverage. 
• Events of interest for the international community 
Inconsistencies in 
reporting criteria across 
different countries. 
U.S. NRC LERs  Open Complete and consistent source for all US NPPs. 
Limited searching 
capabilities. 
3.2.1 IAEA / OECD IRS database 
The International Reporting System for Operating Experience (IRS) is jointly operated by 
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) of 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The IRS is 
established as a simple and efficient system to exchange important lessons learned from 
operating experience gained in nuclear power plants of the IAEA and NEA Member 
States. 
The fundamental objective of the IRS is to contribute to improve the worldwide safe 
operation of commercial nuclear power plants (NPPs). The IRS is collecting detailed 
information on both technical and human factors related to events of safety significance. 
The IRS database contains about 4,000 event reports with detailed descriptions and 
analyses of the event’s causes that may be relevant to other plants. 
The database is accessible to authorised users through a web-based interface, created to 
facilitate data input and online access to reports. The IRS contains a well-defined and 
detailed classification system for events, with a set of codes. Events are searched by 
user-defined criteria composed of free keywords and characterisation codes, among other 
possible criteria available to the user. 
3.2.2 US NRC LERs database 
The US commercial nuclear reactor licensees are required to report certain type of events 
according to the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulation 10CFR50.73. These 
reports are called “Licensee event report” (LER) and they are available to the public on 
the NRC’s website.  More than 50,000 reports are currently available starting from 1980. 
The LER database is searchable using a variety of criteria, including name, dates, reactor 
type and vendor or free text search in the title, abstract and full report. However, LERs 
are stored without detailed characterisation (i.e.: failed system or component, type of 
event effects, related human factors, etc.). 
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3.3 Time period 
Both databases have been searched for events dated from January 2013. The search was 
carried out in September 2018. It must be noted that events occurred in late 2017 or in 
2018 might not yet be included in the databases at the time of the search, particularly in 
the IRS case. 
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4 Search criteria and screening 
IRS events where the «FAILED/AFFECTED SYSTEM» data field contained at least one of 
the following codes were retrieved from the database: 
3.I Instrumentation and control systems 
3.I.2 Digital I&C systems 
3.IA Plant/process computer (including main and auxiliary components) 
3.IB Fire detection 
3.IC Environment monitoring 
3.ID Turbine generator instrumentation and control 
3.IE Plant & process monitoring (including the main and remote/supplementary control 
room equipment and various remote control functions) 
3.IF In-core and ex-core neutron monitoring (including BWR reactor stability 
monitoring) 
3.IG Leak monitoring (reactor coolant boundary, containment and auxiliary buildings) 
3.IH Radiation monitoring 
3.IH.1 Plant radiation monitoring 
3.IH.2 Personnel monitoring (dosimetry & contamination detection) 
3.IK Reactor power control (e.g.: control rods & boration/dilution systems) 
3.IL Recirculation flow control (BWR) 
3.IM Feedwater control 
3.IN Reactor protection 
3.IP Engineered safety features actuation (including emergency systems actuation) 
3.IQ Non-nuclear instrumentation 
3.IR Meteorological instrumentation 
3.IS Seismic instrumentation 
3.IT Vibration monitoring 
Furthermore, IRS events where the «FAILED/AFFECTED COMPONENT» contained at least 
one of the following codes were added to the list of potentially relevant events: 
4.4 Computers 
4.4.1 Computer hardware 
4.4.2 Computer software 
Finally, the IRS database was searched for all events containing the words «digital» or 
«software» in their abstracts. 
Regarding the US LER database, as the search using codes is not possible for the 
relevant data fields (system/component affected), events containing the words «digital» 
or «software» in their titles or abstracts were retrieved. 
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5 Review of the events 
After consolidation (some events were reported to both databases), the search of both 
databases led to a list of 82 events (52 from IRS, 29 from LER and 1 event reported to 
both databases). All these reports were reviewed to screen out those which could not be 
considered within the scope of the study, as described in section 2.1. The final result of 
the process after the screening is the list of 25 event reports presented in Appendix 8.1. 
5.1 Characterisation of the events 
In order to provide a quick insight into the 25 events selected for in-depth analysis, the 
following tables present their classification according to the digital I&C system affected 
(using the IRS coding system) and according to the digital I&C system life cycle phase 
(requirement specification, design, verification & validation, implementation / integration 
/ installation, operation / maintenance and modifications). For the sake of consistency 
with the previous topical study, similar categories were used (only categories with at 
least one event are included in the table). 
Table 2. Distribution of events per digital I&C system affected 
Digital I&C system IRS LER Observations 
Turbine generator instrumentation and 
control 
3 5  
Plant/process computer 5 -  
Feedwater control 1 4  
Leak monitoring - 1  
Engineered safety features actuation 1 1  
Other 3 1 Mostly related to digital control of auxiliary 
systems other than TG and FW 
Total 13 12  
As shown by the table, a large proportion of the events reported concern non-safety 
systems, notably the digital electro-hydraulic control systems of the turbine generator 
and the digital control of feedwater systems. Although not required to reach the safe 
shutdown of the reactor, the correct operation of these balance-of-plant systems is 
critical from the point of view of the plant availability. For this reason, they are usually 
designed according to very demanding quality and reliability requirements, meaning that 
lessons derived from these events are in principle useful as well for safety systems. 
In the case of the reports related to plant and process computers, three of them affected 
the overall plant digital control system (plants recently commissioned, with a high degree 
of digitisation of I&C systems, including safety functions) while the other two impacted 
the operation of more conventional auxiliary computers, not directly linked to real time 
plant process. 
Figure 1. Distribution of events per life cycle phase 
 
The categories used for the distribution of the events per life cycle phase of the digital 
system were the same as in the previous study: requirements specification, design, 
verification and validation (V&V), operation & maintenance and modifications phase. The 
phase «implementation, integration, and installation», which had been used for the 
Requirements - 16% Design - 35% V&V - 13% Operation & maint. - 23% Modification - 13%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
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topical study, has been merged here with the V&V phase, the reason being the difficulties 
in making the difference between the two from the information provided in the event 
reports.  
As shown by Figure 1, events reported span across the entire life cycle, with the design 
phase taking approximately 1/3 of the events and the other 2/3 evenly shared by the 
other phases. 
5.2 Insights from the review of events 
Following the outlined methodology, and further to the characterisation of the event 
reports according to the system affected or the life cycle phase involved, the events were 
also compared to the digital I&C technical challenges as presented in the technical report 
from the IAEA. 
Three particular topics turned out to be reflected in a significant number of events and 
deserve to be highlighted here: the use of smart devices (5 reports), the configuration 
management (4 reports) and digital communications (3 reports). The following 
subsections outline these events and the common themes underlying them. 
5.2.1 Use of smart devices 
The term «smart device» is commonly used to refer to sensors and actuators containing 
computer based technology, usually microprocessors with firmware or embedded 
software. In addition to the traditional sensing/acting functions, smart devices perform 
also calculations and provide communication functions. 
Smart devices have displaced the traditional analogue sensors and actuators from the 
market, and the latter are increasingly difficult to obtain. However, the qualification of 
smart devices for a particular application in a nuclear power plant may require 
independent access to the source code of the embedded software from the vendor. As 
the nuclear industry is small compared to the size of the market served by smart devices 
vendors, the lack of incentives of the latter to disclose proprietary information makes 
difficult for the licensee to ensure adequate verification and validation. Sometimes it is 
difficult for the licensee even to identify that embedded software is present in equipment 
supplied as a package. 
An additional challenge is that, because they are very flexible supporting different 
configurations, smart devices may be used for many different applications across the 
plant. This fact introduces two new issues: 
— The common cause failure mode of the software embedded in the same smart device 
model may now affect a large number of components/systems 
— For the sake of flexibility, a smart device model may contain many software functions 
that are not actually needed for a given application. These inactive functions could 
interfere however with the required ones, if the device is not configured properly, or if 
the software contains an error. 
One of the event reports describes the case where a licensee discovered in 2014 that a 
certain type of relay used in the automatic start of the emergency diesel generators 
contained embedded software (a microprocessor controlled the coils of the relays). These 
relays had been installed a few years earlier, and therefore, the common cause failure 
mode of the embedded software had not been taken into account. This event is an 
example of inadequate qualification of a smart device for a safety-related application 
(malfunction of the relays would have disabled the automatic start of the emergency 
diesel generators). 
The other four events related to this topic concern only non-safety related applications. 
In the first one, the smart device involved was the automatic voltage regulator used for 
the control of the main generator. The root cause of the event was that this component 
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had not been sufficiently validated by site personnel. More specifically, an independent 
failure analysis of the new equipment by the licensee had not been possible because the 
proprietary information required was not readily available, and the simulator provided by 
the vendor was not able to replicate actual conditions of the plant. The failure resulted in 
a generator trip followed by a reactor scram. 
In the second event, an unnecessary turbine trip (followed by a reactor trip) was caused 
by the failure of a power supply module on a circuit board in the digital electro-hydraulic 
turbine control system. However the trip would have never progressed if unnecessary trip 
logic associated with turbine overspeed monitoring had not been present in the turbine 
control system. 
In another case, when operators of a BWR were preparing to transition from motor-
driven feedwater pump to turbine-driven feedwater pump as part of the plant power 
ascension after an outage (the reactor was already in mode 1 at 18% of full power), the 
feedwater flow started to fluctuate, leading to reactor vessel water level swings of 
growing amplitude, and the operators proceeded with a manual reactor scram. Software 
errors in the digital feedwater module were the immediate cause of the event. The root 
cause was that the software embedded in the digital feedwater control contained 
parameters that were not identified, evaluated and mitigated in the corresponding 
engineering change package. As a corrective action, the plant has given mandate that 
any engineering judgements and unverified assumptions encapsulated within vendor 
provided software be clearly identified and independently validated prior to modification 
completion. 
The last event involved the loss of the Instrument Air system, later leading to a manual 
reactor trip and a safety injection signal. The plant had one electric-driven compressor 
operating normally, with two additional diesel-driven compressors available in standby. 
During a routine round, an operator inadvertently pushed the load/unload button in the 
operating compressor digital control display (he was trying to get the screen to a 
different mode, and direct sunlight made difficult to see it). The standby compressors 
started but did not load. The reason was that a cooling fan permissive in the PLC coding 
(not required in standby mode) left the compressors in a non-responsive state. The 
vendor supplied compressor software had not been subject to a detailed technical review 
by plant staff. 
5.2.2 Configuration management 
Configuration management is a quality assurance issue applicable to all components, and 
not specifically to digital I&C systems. However, in the case of digital I&C systems, the 
number of software and hardware items, as well as the number of associated documents 
supporting those items, is particularly high. Furthermore, software is typically subject to 
a very high number of modifications before and after commissioning, which makes the 
topic particularly relevant in this case.  
A weak or superficial configuration management process is often the underlying cause of 
many difficulties found during software modifications or digital I&C upgrades. 
Four events can be linked to configuration management problems. Two of them involved 
the digital control of the turbogenerator and the other two caused malfunctions on the 
feedwater system. In all cases, modifications in these systems were not properly 
documented, or the impact on the plant behaviour was not properly understood. No 
safety system was affected in these cases, and the consequences were limited to a 
reactor trip. 
5.2.3 Digital communications 
Digital I&C systems provide the ability to exchange large amounts of data between 
different systems. Contrary to analogue point to point connections, digital communication 
technology typically uses networks, with a single connection passing multiple signals. 
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This creates new failure modes where faults may propagate through connected systems, 
or the failure of the connection itself can cause multiple faults in different systems. 
There are many valid reasons for safety systems to share data with non safety systems, 
or for different safety channels to share data between themselves. Therefore the design 
needs to carefully prevent the possible propagation of failures through communication 
networks to ensure real independence between redundant channels and between safety 
and non safety systems. 
Two very similar events were reported in 2014 by reactors featuring modern digital 
platforms for the control of safety systems. In both cases the operator stations and large 
screens at main control room of the computer information and control system went 
suddenly blank and control was manually transferred to the backup panel for about half 
an hour (the time to reboot the central data processing server). In one case the reactor 
was operating at full power, in the other case it was at hot shutdown. Both events were 
attributed to excessive CPU load created by synchronisation of large data sets from an 
auxiliary server used to process historical data. 
Another example of issues with digital communications was experienced by a plant which 
had commissioned a new digital electrohydraulic control system for the main turbine in 
2010. This is not a safety system; however it had been designed to prevent single 
failures from causing turbine trips, because of availability considerations. The system was 
thoroughly tested during its commissioning, including the capability of the standby CPU 
to take over from the online CPU in case of failure of the latter. Even so, after one year of 
normal system operation, the standby unit was unable to take over from the operating 
one after some intermittent communication losses between the two CPUs, leading to a 
turbine trip. The original vendor improved the system's architecture to solve the issue, 
however several years later a single failure in a communication hub progressed 
immediately to a turbine and reactor trips. The CPU in operation had not recognised the 
failure in the hub, so the automatic switchover to the redundant CPU (not affected by the 
communications hub failure) never took place, thus defeating the redundancy of both 
channels. 
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6 Lessons learned 
The following lessons can be derived from the review of recent operating experience with 
digital I&C systems in power reactors.  
Box 1. Review of embedded software. 
Assumptions and engineering judgments used to develop software embedded in digital 
I&C components should be clearly identified, and then verified by staff familiar with plant 
design and operation, independently from the component vendor. 
It has been observed that sometimes the licensees rely excessively on the expertise from 
vendors of digital I&C components to understand and review the software embedded in 
such components (digital relays, PLCs, microprocessors ...). Often, the information 
required for an independent verification is proprietary and is not readily available to plant 
staff. As software developers might not be fully familiar with plant process parameters 
and behaviour, there is a risk that a misunderstanding about the actual values taken by a 
plant parameter under certain circumstances will result in a software error. In most 
cases, these errors will be detected during the component V&V, but if the error is 
associated to very specific and infrequent plant configurations, it could slip through the 
V&V process. The verification of the embedded software by staff familiar with the plant 
processes should include function blocks, mathematical calculations and modelled plant 
behaviour.  
Whenever this verification has been overlooked, the failure of the digital I&C component 
has led to a wide variety of effects on plant operation, as these components are more 
and more widely used across nuclear plants. Typical examples include feedwater flow 
perturbations (leading to reactor trips), spurious activation of generator protections or 
the loss of instrument air. In one case, embedded software had been used for digital 
relays being part of the diesel generator control system, without the licensee being aware 
of it. 
Box 2. Common cause failures in software. 
When digital I&C systems are required to be single failure proof, the actual fulfilment of 
this requirement should be carefully reviewed, verified and validated. 
Operating experience shows that some digital I&C systems designed to be resistant to 
single failures contain hidden, unanalysed failure modes challenging the independence of 
redundant chains. This has been experienced particularly in the case of systems including 
network communication components. 
Digital systems resistant to single failures often feature two independent processing 
units, each receiving input from different sources. One of the units is online while the 
other is in standby to take over if the operating unit fails. However some cases have 
been reported where the switchover failed because the original fault was not recognised 
as such by the operating processor. 
Box 3. Interactions between safety and auxiliary functions of software. 
The design of safety related digital I&C systems containing software should be such that 
auxiliary functions performed by the system do not interfere with the safety function. 
The practice of reusing software modules previously developed for other applications is 
commonly used by software developers. This poses a risk of introducing unnecessary 
functionalities that, under certain circumstances, might lead to software errors. Similar 
risks appear when the same hardware (like a server) is used to run safety related 
applications together with other secondary tasks. 
Plants equipped with fully digital plant control systems experienced disruptions on its 
computer operator stations because the main server was overloaded with data 
15 
synchronisation requested by an auxiliary server used for historical data processing and 
filing. The hardware performance of the main server was insufficient to handle the data 
load and was shutdown. 
Box 4. Optical fibre technology. 
Installation and maintenance of optical fibre technology should be done according to 
detailed specific procedures and after following adequate training. 
Optical fibre connectors are susceptible to failure caused by dirt and other failure modes 
linked to the inadequate layout of the optical fibre cables. 
In one case, the presence of dirt at an optical fibre connector disturbed the exchange of 
data between a module located at the switchyard and the main control room, generating 
a spurious load rejection signal that resulted in turbine and reactor trip. A modification of 
the system to make it resistant to single failures was planned, but not yet implemented. 
Box 5. Impact of software modifications on procedures. 
The modifications of digital I&C systems' operational procedures following software 
modifications should be validated. 
Sometimes the modifications in the software of digital systems may appear to be minor, 
not requiring validation of the updated procedures. However subtle interactions between 
different parameters may lead to unexpected results. 
In one NPP with two reactor units, a modification in the digital electrohydraulic control of 
the turbine had been carried out in one of the units, in order to improve the regulation of 
the reactor pressure during start-up using the main steam bypass valves. The 
corresponding operational procedure was updated and validated. However, when the 
same modification was implemented one year later in the other reactor unit, it was 
judged that the procedure update did not require a validation. Due to some minor 
operational differences between the two reactor units, in this case the procedure was 
incorrect, suddenly leading to the bypass valves to the fully open position and causing a 
reactor trip. 
Box 6. Ergonomics of digital systems human-machine interfaces. 
Special attention should be paid to ergonomic considerations of displays and touch 
screens used to control equipment important for safety. 
The widespread use of digital displays, LCD screens, touch screens etc. in many different 
locations across the NPPs gives more and more importance to the ergonomics of these 
human-machine interfaces. Although rarely the root cause of a serious event on its own, 
the lack of contrast or sharpness in digital displays can increase the probability of 
operator error. 
A case was reported where the operators inadvertently opened one of the main steam 
dump valves to the atmosphere while they were introducing commands through a local 
touch screen panel in the framework of a test procedure. A contributing factor to this 
human error was that it was difficult to distinguish the different colours used in the 
display to highlight the various menu options available, and that the room lighting 
created disturbing glares on the display. 
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7 Conclusions 
The safety significance of the events reported by nuclear power plants worldwide in 
relation to digital I&C systems during the past five or six years is very low. It can be 
argued that computer-based systems are used mostly in non safety applications, thus 
explaining why the events reported did not compromise the safety of the plants. However 
the number of plants which have upgraded their I&C systems to fully digital platforms, 
together with the new builds now entering commercial operation (with digital safety 
systems as part of their original design) is gradually increasing. In these cases, systems 
like the reactor protection or emergency core cooling rely on computers. Particularly in 
the case of modernisation projects of existing plants, one could expect a high chance of 
experiencing safety significant events, if only because of the complexities of the 
modifications involved. However this does not seem to be the case, at least for the 
moment. 
In the case of events related to the safety / security interface, again their number and 
safety relevance are very limited. However, it must be recognised that events having any 
aspect related to security are very unlikely to be reported to the databases used for this 
study, therefore making impossible any conclusion regarding the trend of this type of 
events.  
Beyond the discussion on the safety significance of the events, the experience 
accumulated with the operation of non safety systems such as the electro-hydraulic 
control of the main turbine or the main feedwater control can offer valuable lessons for 
the design, operation and regulatory oversight of safety systems. This study has 
identified some of them, based on the review of 25 relevant events reported since 2013. 
A recurrent theme underlying many of the events reviewed is that software developers 
on one hand and engineering staff familiar with the plant design and operation on the 
other hand not always find easy to understand each other and not always have access to 
the same information (with access to proprietary code being cited as an issue in some 
cases). This may lead the licensees to rely excessively on vendors for software 
verification and validation, particularly when software is embedded in isolated 
components. When this weakness is added to the inherent "sneaky" character of many 
software failure modes and to the complexities of software validation in a real operation 
environment, the chances for software defects to pass through all quality assurance 
barriers may be significant. The strict adherence to software development guidance 
remains one of the most important among these barriers. 
 Vendors and licensees should ensure full and independent verification and validation of 
software embedded in safety-related components. 
 Inspectors working for nuclear safety authorities should give high priority in their 
oversight tasks to make sure that licensees have robust policies in place to identify 
embedded software in safety-related applications, and that this software is subject to 
appropriate V&V processes. 
Furthermore, nuclear safety authorities' management should periodically verify that 
current regulations correctly address the observed operating experience, as summarised, 
among many other sources, by this study. 
Finally, it has been observed that most if not all lessons learned formulated in this report 
could be linked to topics widely discussed in the literature (albeit perhaps described in 
different words), and particularly to the previous topical study published in 2012. As is 
often the case, this review of operating experience did not bring new issues to the 
attention of the industry and safety authorities; however, it confirms the need to better 
use the available feedback, and appropriately manage the gained knowledge to avoid the 
recurrence of issues already known to the industry. 
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List of abbreviations and definitions 
CH European Clearinghouse 
CPU Central Processing Unit 
I&C Instrumentation and Control 
IRS International Reporting System or operating experience 
JRC Joint Research Centre 
LCD Liquid Crystal Display 
LER Licensee Event Report 
MDEP Multinational Design Evaluation Program 
NEA Nuclear Energy Agency 
NPP Nuclear Power Plant 
NRC US Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
OEF Operating Experience Feedback 
PLC Programmable Logic Controller 
TSO Technical Support Organisation 
V&V Verification and Validation 
WENRA Western European Nuclear Regulators Association 
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Annexes 
Annex 1: List of events 
Source Year Title 
NRC 2013 Software errors in new digital feedwater control system result in manual reactor scram due to approaching 
high reactor pressure vessel water level setpoint. 
NRC 2013 Manual reactor scram due to loss of reactor feedwater pumps. 
NRC 2013 Reactor trip due to generator trip during main generator reactive power testing. 
IAEA/OECD 2013 Escalated malfunction risk in the safety classified relays. 
NRC 2014 Condition prohibited by technical specifications due to an instrument tunnel sump level indication 
transmitter incompatible with the containment environment. 
NRC 2014 Reactor scram during automatic voltage regulator channel transfer. 
IAEA/OECD 2014 KIC operator station shortly unavailability. 
IAEA/OECD 2014 The operator station of computer information and control system (KIC) is unavailable temporarily. 
IAEA/OECD 2014 Operating experience regarding complications from a loss of instrument air. 
IAEA/OECD 2014 Computer virus found on various plant laptops and media. 
IAEA/OECD 2014 Unit scram on loss of power to one out of two operating RCPs due to short circuit in the 500 kV outdoor 
switchgear caused by human errors. 
IAEA/OECD 2014 Short time unavailability of computer information and control system (KIC) operator station. 
IAEA/OECD 2014 Reactor scram due to loss of signal status from 400 kV line to digital electrohydraulic control. 
NRC 2015 Manual auxiliary feedwater system actuation. 
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Source Year Title 
NRC 2015 Turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump in a condition prohibited by technical specifications due to a design 
issue. 
NRC 2015 Valid automatic actuation of the reactor protection system due to main steam bypass valves opening. 
NRC 2015 Automatic reactor trip results from a turbine trip initiated from the digital electro-hydraulic control system. 
NRC 2015 Reactor scram due to digital protective relay system lockout. 
IAEA/OECD 2015 Improper flow accelerated corrosion model results in 4-inch steam line failure and manual reactor trip. 
IAEA/OECD 2015 Reactor scram due to main turbine trip. 
IAEA/OECD 2016 Violation of instruction requirements resulting in computer infection by virus. 
IAEA/OECD 2016 Level fluctuation of steam generator caused by sudden close of feedwater flow control valve. 
IAEA/OECD 2017 Personnel erroneous actions that led to opening the steam dump valve to the atmosphere. 
NRC 2018 Manual unit trip on low steam generator level following trip of a turbine feedwater pump due to a design 
issue. 
NRC 2018 Automatic reactor scram due to an unanticipated electro-hydraulic control logic condition. 
Source: IAEA/OECD and NRC. 
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